The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783 . of the metliod of attack, Ruyteravailed himself of his local knowledge, keeping so close tothe beach that the enemy dared not approach, — the moreso as it was late in the day. During the night the windshifted to east-southeast off the land, and at daybreak, to usethe words of a French official narrative, the Dutch madeall sail and stood down boldly into action. The allied fleet was to leeward on the port tack, headingabout south, — the French in the van, Rupert in the centre,and Sir Edward Spragge commanding the rear. De Ruyterdivided his fl
The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783 . of the metliod of attack, Ruyteravailed himself of his local knowledge, keeping so close tothe beach that the enemy dared not approach, — the moreso as it was late in the day. During the night the windshifted to east-southeast off the land, and at daybreak, to usethe words of a French official narrative, the Dutch madeall sail and stood down boldly into action. The allied fleet was to leeward on the port tack, headingabout south, — the French in the van, Rupert in the centre,and Sir Edward Spragge commanding the rear. De Ruyterdivided his fleet into three squadrons, the leading one ofwhich, of ten or twelve ships only, he sent against theFrench; while with the rest of his force he attacked theEnglish in the centre and rear (Plate IV., A, A, A). If weaccept the English estimate of the forces, which gives the Eng-lish sixty ships, the French thirty, and the Dutch seventy,Ruyters plan of attack, by simply holding the French incheck as at Solebay, allowed him to engage the English on. CO •?c* a.
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Keywords: ., bookcentury1800, bookdecade1890, booksubjectseapowe, bookyear1890
