MrLloyd George and the war . re proved impossible to break through the German lines, solarge a margin of safety was needed that troops could not bewithdrawn from his theatre, and that there were no theatresother than those which were then in progress in which decisiveresults could be obtained. In Lord Frenchs book we can also find the appreciation byGeneral Joffre and the French General Staff, wliich is short andprecise : (i) I wish to call your attention to the following points: (2) The French General Staff consider a German offensive possible—even probable—in the near future. (3) Our front m
MrLloyd George and the war . re proved impossible to break through the German lines, solarge a margin of safety was needed that troops could not bewithdrawn from his theatre, and that there were no theatresother than those which were then in progress in which decisiveresults could be obtained. In Lord Frenchs book we can also find the appreciation byGeneral Joffre and the French General Staff, wliich is short andprecise : (i) I wish to call your attention to the following points: (2) The French General Staff consider a German offensive possible—even probable—in the near future. (3) Our front must, therefore, be made absolutely secure. If broken,for example, about Roye and Montdidier, the consequences for the Allieswould be of tlie most serious description. (4) In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the position of beingable to resume the offensive. (5) Because of (3) and (4) reserves are absolutely necessary. (6) For these reasons 1 am anxious for a rapid release of the Corps,north of the British LORD FRENCH WEST OR EAST? 105 (7) We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and all secondaryoperations must give way. (8) Operations towards Ostend-Zeebrugge, though important, are forthe moment secondary, and, in my opinion, should follow, rather thanprecede, the principal action, viz. the collection of reserves. To resume : (a) To beat the enemy, it is necessary to have reserves. (b) These reserves can only come from the North as British reinforce-ments set them free. (c) The German menace, not a vain thing, makes it necessary to collectthese reserves in the shortest possible time. {d) The main object, viz. the defeat of the enemy, makes it necessaryto delay the offensive towards Ostend-Zeebrugge. Another memorandum, on January 1, 1915, called attentionto the remarkable deadlock which had occurred on the WesternFront, suggested that Germany could perhaps be struck mosteffectively and with the most lasting results on the Peace of theworld through
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