. Battles and leaders of the Civil War : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers . readily eordd have done, the transportationnecessary. As it was—though the difficult part of this imiiracticable ^ planof operations had been proven feasible, that is, the concentration of the Shen-andoah forces with mine (wiung later than the eleventh hoiir through thealarm over the march upon Richmond, and discountenanced again nervouslyat the twelfth hour by another alarm as to how the enemy may vary hisplans in consequence), followed by the decisive defeat of the main Federalf
. Battles and leaders of the Civil War : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers . readily eordd have done, the transportationnecessary. As it was—though the difficult part of this imiiracticable ^ planof operations had been proven feasible, that is, the concentration of the Shen-andoah forces with mine (wiung later than the eleventh hoiir through thealarm over the march upon Richmond, and discountenanced again nervouslyat the twelfth hour by another alarm as to how the enemy may vary hisplans in consequence), followed by the decisive defeat of the main Federalforces — nevertheless the army remainetl rooted in the spot, although wehad more than fifteen thousand troops who had been not at aU or but littlein the battle and were perfectly organized, while the remaining commands,in the high spirits of victory, coidd have been reorganized at the tap of thedium, and many with improved captured arms and equipments. I hadalready urged my views with unusual persistency, and acted on tliem againstall but an express order to the contrary; and as they had been deliberately. FAIHFAX COURT HOUSE. A WAR-TIME THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 22\ rejected in their ultimate scope by Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief, Idid not feel authorized to urge them fuither than their execution had beenallowed, unless the subject were broached anew by himseU. But there wasno intimation of any such change of purpose, and the army, consistentlywith this inertia, was left unprovided for manoeuvre with transportation forits ammunition; its fortitude, moreover, as a new and volunteer army, whilespending sometimes 24 hoius without food, being only less wonderful thanthe commissary administration at Richmond, from which such a state ofaffairs could proceed even two weeks after the battle of Manassas. Althoughcertain political superstitions about not consolidating the North may thenhave weighed against the action I proposed, they would have been ligh
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