The history of the French revolution; . RMIES AT THE ALPS AND AT THE PYRENEES—STATE OF LAVENDEE—PUISAYE IN BRETAGNE—CORRESPONDENCE OF THE ROY-ALIST PARTY WITH THE FKENCH PRINCES. Tub activity of military operations was somewhat relaxed about the mid-dle of the summer. The two great French armies of the North and of theSambre and Meuse, which had entered Brussels in Thermidor (July), andthen proceeded, the one upon Antwerp, the other towards the Meuse, hadenjoyed a long rest, waiting for the reduction of the fortresses of Landre-cies, Le Quesnoi, Valenciennes, aud Conde, which had been lost dur
The history of the French revolution; . RMIES AT THE ALPS AND AT THE PYRENEES—STATE OF LAVENDEE—PUISAYE IN BRETAGNE—CORRESPONDENCE OF THE ROY-ALIST PARTY WITH THE FKENCH PRINCES. Tub activity of military operations was somewhat relaxed about the mid-dle of the summer. The two great French armies of the North and of theSambre and Meuse, which had entered Brussels in Thermidor (July), andthen proceeded, the one upon Antwerp, the other towards the Meuse, hadenjoyed a long rest, waiting for the reduction of the fortresses of Landre-cies, Le Quesnoi, Valenciennes, aud Conde, which had been lost during thepreceding campaign. On the Rhine, General Michaud was engaged in re-eomposing his army, in order to repair the check of Kaiserslautern, andawaited a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men drawn from La armies of the Alps and of Italy, having made themselves masters ofhe great chain, encamped on the heights of the Alps, while waiting for theipproval of a plan of invasion proposed, it was said, by the young officer. K:(:UA\Vi?,js-^ir FRENCH REVOLUTION. 137 who had decided the taking of Toulon and of the linrs of Saorgio.* Atthe eastern Pyrenees, Dugommier, after his success at the Boulou, had stop-ped for a considerable time to reduce Collioure, and was now bloclcadinfBellegarde. The army of the western Pyrenees was stili organizing itselfThis long inactivity, which marked the middle of the campaign, and whichmust be imputed to the imprrtant events in the interior and to bad combina-tions, might have been a drawback upon our successes, had the enemy knownhow to profit by the occasion. But such indecision prevailed among theallies that our fault was of no benefit to them, and only served to defer alittle the extraordinary tide of our successes. Nothing was worse calculated than our inactivity in Belgium in the envi-rons of Antwerp, and on the banks of the Meuse. The surest means ofaccelerating the reduction of the four lost fortresses would have been toremov
Size: 1528px × 1636px
Photo credit: © The Reading Room / Alamy / Afripics
License: Licensed
Model Released: No
Keywords: ., bookauthorshoberlfrederic177518, bookcentury1800, bookdecade1860
