Julius Caesar and the foundation of the Roman imperial system . ad wasthe only land-route from the Adriatic to Asia Minorand the East ; and so long as Pompeius held it in itswhole length, and was master of Dyrrhachium andof the seas, it was practically impossible for Caesar toattack him. He on the other hand might easilyattack or at least blockade Italy, and then proceedto use it as a base of operations for the reduction ofGaul and Spain. / Three facts will here strike the reader: first, thatthe strategical advantages were all on the side ofPompeius, who could strike without serious risk froma
Julius Caesar and the foundation of the Roman imperial system . ad wasthe only land-route from the Adriatic to Asia Minorand the East ; and so long as Pompeius held it in itswhole length, and was master of Dyrrhachium andof the seas, it was practically impossible for Caesar toattack him. He on the other hand might easilyattack or at least blockade Italy, and then proceedto use it as a base of operations for the reduction ofGaul and Spain. / Three facts will here strike the reader: first, thatthe strategical advantages were all on the side ofPompeius, who could strike without serious risk froman almost impregnable position; secondly, that thekey of the whole military situation is the port ofDyrrhachium; thirdly, that now for the first timethe eastern and western portions of the Roman Em-pire are seen politically separated, owning differentmasters, and about to engage in a deadly strugglefor supremacy.! Caesars first object was at all risks to get posses-sion of Dyrrhachium ; but to do this, or even tohold it when seized, without command of the sea,. MAP OF OPERATIONS NEAR DYRRACHIUM, 48 (after stoffel). a. c/esars principal camp. b. pompeius principal camp. c. camp occupied by pompeius, the scene of his victory after breaking the unfinished lines. 48 Dyrrhachium and Pharsalus. 283 would be a more dangerous task than any he hadever undertaken. He might well have chosen tostay and rule in Italy and the West, and to leavePompeius to his own devices. But there is no moresignal proof of the great instincts which governedhim, than the fact that he resolved to attack at allhazards. I What use would there be in legislating andorganising, so long as there was a power left to growin the East, which might return at his death todestroy all his work ? j He never seems to have hesi-tated, either as to the necessity of attacking, or theway in which it should be done. The regular routefrom Rome to Dyrrhachium and the East was by thegreat road to Brundisium, whence the sea
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Keywords: ., bo, bookcentury1800, booksubjectcaesarjulius, booksubjectgenerals
