The nation . estic politi-cal opponents. Whether the opposi-tion be overt (as in most of theWestern states) or covert (as inthe more autocratic, one-party sys-tems), it is always there, ready toattack. And the oppositions mostpopular and effective charge is thatthe incumbents have been soft indealing with the enemy. (Thischarge, it should be noted, has littleto do with political ideology: inthe United States, the DemocraticParty has attacked Eisenhower in July 9, I960 much the same way that the Re-publicans attacked Truman. Wheth-er the specifics deal with an in-adequate defense budget or sell
The nation . estic politi-cal opponents. Whether the opposi-tion be overt (as in most of theWestern states) or covert (as inthe more autocratic, one-party sys-tems), it is always there, ready toattack. And the oppositions mostpopular and effective charge is thatthe incumbents have been soft indealing with the enemy. (Thischarge, it should be noted, has littleto do with political ideology: inthe United States, the DemocraticParty has attacked Eisenhower in July 9, I960 much the same way that the Re-publicans attacked Truman. Wheth-er the specifics deal with an in-adequate defense budget or sellingout at Yalta or Potsdam, the es-sence of the charge is the same.)Returning to the late and lamentedSummit liasco again, it is worthnoting that many experts explainedKhrushchevs bellicosity as due pri-marily to a need to answer those ofhis Kremlin critics who had chargedhim with appeasement. Obviouslythere were other factors, but highon the priorit) list of politicians isthe passion for retaining power, and. < iropper there is no reason to believe thatthe Soviet First Secretary is atypi-cal in this regard. One of the fascinating aspects ofthe Paris events of early May is theI act that both Eisenhower andKhrushchev could have strengthenedthe others position at home bymutually supportive and conciliatorybehavior, but neither could affordto do this without at the same timemaking himself vulnerable to ap-peasement charges and thus weak-ening his own domestic power posi-tion. Here, too, statesmen are caughtin a trap which renders diplomacynearly ineffectual. There is still a third aspect of do-mestic politics which tends to in-hibit imaginative and creative dip-lomacy. Not only does the generationof mass attitudes of bellicosity, fearand suspicion reduce the flexibilityof those responsible for the nations security, but it tends to silence thoseoutside of government who mighthave a useful contribution to a recently circulated privatememorandum, spokesmen for theRepublica
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Keywords: ., bookcentury1800, bookdecade1860, bookidnation191jul, bookyear1865
