The nation . rve it. Our attitude in the Ber-lin question and Russias actions inPoland and Hungary in 1956 amplydemonstrate that willingness to accept thissituation has already been shown byrecognition of the West German gov-ernment; the parallel course for us,pointing the way to the end of theGerman question and the Berlinquestion, lies in our recognition ofthe East German government, withall that that implies. Is such a settlement in our in- September 10, I960 terests? Although detailed arrange*-ments will be very difficult to arriveat, an accommodation on the basisof a
The nation . rve it. Our attitude in the Ber-lin question and Russias actions inPoland and Hungary in 1956 amplydemonstrate that willingness to accept thissituation has already been shown byrecognition of the West German gov-ernment; the parallel course for us,pointing the way to the end of theGerman question and the Berlinquestion, lies in our recognition ofthe East German government, withall that that implies. Is such a settlement in our in- September 10, I960 terests? Although detailed arrange*-ments will be very difficult to arriveat, an accommodation on the basisof an exact reciprocal regard for thestrategic interests of both East and\\ est can, in principle, be found. Noother outstanding issue has this ad-vantage. Moreover, a German set-tlement should include not only rec-ognition of the East German govern-ment but a retreat from our Potsdamposition and a recognition of the ex-isting borders of Poland. In thisway, the freedom of action of WestGermany might be faiPptA- More important, any relaxation ofWestern pressure upon the satellitesystem must necessarily result in arelaxation of Russian pressure onthese states. Thus, a Western guar-antee of Polands present borderspromises not only freedom of actionfor Germany but for Poland as history of the Hungarian up-rising in 1956 might have run anentirely different course had thefuture of Germany been settled atthe time when Nagy held , recognition of the satellitesystem of Eastern Europe and dis-engagement through some recipro-cal withdrawal of American and Rus-sian forces stands as the only pres-ent path to possible freedom forthese states: the heavier the West-ern military pressure on the Soviet Union, the heavier must the Rus-sian yoke rest upon the states ofEastern Europe. Whatever kindnesswe can do for these countries canbe done only through detente withthe Soviet Union. Of course, the Khrushchev propos-als are also to the advantage of theSoviet Union (else
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Keywords: ., bookcentury1800, bookdecade1860, bookidnation191jul, bookyear1865
