. Battles of the nineteenth century . ss the little riverMincio, which formed the boundary betweenLombardy and Venetia, thus attacking theAustrians in front ; while the second army ofbo,ooo men under Cialdini would be in aposition to cross the lower course of the Po,and fall upon their flank. On the left of theroyal army Garibaldi was assembling a thirdforce of between 30,000 and 40,000 men, withwhich he was to invade the Tyrol. 24S BATTLES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. To meet these three armies—amounting inall to at least 235,000 men—the ArchdukeAlbert had nominally at his disposal a forceof 13


. Battles of the nineteenth century . ss the little riverMincio, which formed the boundary betweenLombardy and Venetia, thus attacking theAustrians in front ; while the second army ofbo,ooo men under Cialdini would be in aposition to cross the lower course of the Po,and fall upon their flank. On the left of theroyal army Garibaldi was assembling a thirdforce of between 30,000 and 40,000 men, withwhich he was to invade the Tyrol. 24S BATTLES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. To meet these three armies—amounting inall to at least 235,000 men—the ArchdukeAlbert had nominally at his disposal a forceof 135,000. Thus,he had a majority of 100,000against him at the very outset, but even thisdoes not represent the whole deficiency. Firsthe had to detach 12,000 men for the defenceof the Tyrol. These were expected to be ableto deal with Garibaldis 30,000 or 40,000volunteers ; 12,000 more were assigned to thedefence of Istria and the neighbourhood ofTrieste and Pola, where, considering thestrength of Italy on the sea, there was supposed. ^^o be some danger of a naval descent ; 40,000T^ere employed in the garrisons of the Quadri-lateral (Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Leg-nago) and in the fortresses of Rovigo andVenice ; finally 6,000 had to be left to guardhis communications with Austria. This reducedthe field army to a little over 60,000 men, andwith these he had to meet the 200,000 of Italy. The Italians had divided their forces, and theArchduke saw that his best chance of successwould lie in an attempt to deal with one oftheir armies before the other could come toits assistance. In order to do this it wouldbe necessary from the verj outset to concealhis own position and movements, and be fullyinformed of those of his opponents. Therefore,concentrating his army in a central positionbehind the Adige, a little to the east of Verona,a point from which he could move either against the King or against Cialdini, he left only a screenof cavalry outposts along the Mincio, betweenPeschier


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