An outline of the necessary laws of thought; a treatise on pure and applied logic . ylus. ManfeVs Prolegomena, p. 17, Cou-Jin, Frag. Philof. on Maine de Biran. Dwval-Jou^ve Logique,§^189, feq. Ptarts Cratylus. OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OFTHOUGHT. c Hujus difciplinae fhidium atque cognitio in principiis quidemtetra et afpernabilis infuavifque efTe et inutilis videri folet:fed ubi aliquantum procefferis, turn denique et emolumen-tum ejus in animo tuo dilucebit, et fequetur quaedam difcen-di voluptas infatiabilis. Aulus Gellius. INTRODUCTION concluded. §33-OGIC has been called an a priori fcience. The
An outline of the necessary laws of thought; a treatise on pure and applied logic . ylus. ManfeVs Prolegomena, p. 17, Cou-Jin, Frag. Philof. on Maine de Biran. Dwval-Jou^ve Logique,§^189, feq. Ptarts Cratylus. OUTLINE OF THE LAWS OFTHOUGHT. c Hujus difciplinae fhidium atque cognitio in principiis quidemtetra et afpernabilis infuavifque efTe et inutilis videri folet:fed ubi aliquantum procefferis, turn denique et emolumen-tum ejus in animo tuo dilucebit, et fequetur quaedam difcen-di voluptas infatiabilis. Aulus Gellius. INTRODUCTION concluded. §33-OGIC has been called an a priori fcience. The diftin£lion between truths a priori and truths a po/leriGri^ as obferved uni- verfally by modern writers, may be drawn as follows. If there are any truths which the mind poflefles, whether confcioufly or unconfciouily, before and independent of experience, they may be called a priori truths, as belonging to it prior to all that it acquires from the world around. On the other hand, truths which are acquired by obfervation and experience, are called a pojieriori truths, becaufe. LAWS OF THOUGHT. 63 they come to the mind after it has become acquaint-ed with external facts. How far a priori truths orideas are poflible, is the great campus philofophorum^the great controverted queftion of mental entering into it, and that only fo far as our pre-fent purpofe requires, we muft remove from it onegreat caufe of mifunderftanding. No one at prefentmaintains that the mind can know anything at apoint of time before its obfervation of external thingsbegan; a mind in that condition would be full ofthick darknefs. However independent of experienceany procefs may appear to be now, as for inftance,that by which geometrical truths are proved, we maybe fure that we made much ufe of obfervation beforewe educed the very laws which place it in our mindsfar above all need of confirmatory evidence from ob-fervation. A mind which never obferved, would notbe a mind. But the queftion is wh
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